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ABSTRACT 
The increasing of complexity of safety relevant functions, 
as well as their implementation on distributed components 
is one of the major issues in automotive engineering. The 
situation is additionally tightened by challenges arising 
from the introduction of ISO26262 standard.   
It is discussed how a model based systems engineering 
approach enables the integration of the safety activities into 
the development process to deal with growing complexity 
and to improve efficiency as well. Finally the extension of 
the product line engineering approach to work products of 
safety activities can lead to the step change required to 
match the capabilities of engineering departments to the 
complexities of the task at hand.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last 25 years, the automotive industry has seen 
an exponential rise in the number of safety-relevant E/E 
enabled vehicle functions. These functions are not only 
increasing in number, but also in complexity, authority 
over the control of the vehicle and the level of interaction 
between (see Figure 1, based on personal experience and 
observations).  
 
Figure 1: Complexity issues in automotive systems 
Decontentisation, i.e., reducing the number and 
behavioural scope of the functions themselves is one 
method of reducing complexity. However, this approach is 
limited due to market pressure on the differentiation 
between vehicle manufacturers and therefore the need for 
ever more innovative functions, in particular in the area of 
active and passive safety, which by definition can lead to 
safety-related incidents if they malfunction. 
With the introduction of the automotive industry specific 
standard on functional safety, ISO 26262 [1], currently 
released as a draft international standard, there is also an 
increasing need to ensure that best practice has been 
applied during the development of the systems and to 
provide a convincing argument that the developed systems 
are safe.  
We see a number of factors that limit the capability of the 
industry to fulfil the above mentioned requirements with 
given development practices and resources. The sheer 
number of systems to be developed and the rate of 
technological change combined with a lack of sufficiently 
trained and experienced safety engineers result in development 
projects being insufficiently supported. In addition, despite 
increasing efforts to adhere to models such as CMMI [2] and 
SPICE [3], the process discipline required to efficiently and 
effectively perform the systems engineering with the necessary 
level of rigour is often lacking. This is, however, often more due 
to inappropriate processes and tools rather than an ingrained 
resistance to the engineering principles themselves. 
 
Figure 2: Capability issues in automotive systems engineering 
Due to the issues described above and summarized in 
Figure 2, we see a strong need for major changes in the 
approaches taken to the systems engineering of safety-
relevant automotive E/E functions. On the one hand, to 
provide the efficiency to allow for the number, size and 
complexity of functions to be developed to a sufficiently 
high standard and on the other to provide a clear 
framework within which a convincing argument for the 
functional safety of the systems can be made. The rest of 
this paper discusses how a stronger integration of the safety 
case into the development activities, progress in the areas 
of product-line development and model-driven systems 
engineering can lead to the step-change required to match 
the capabilities of the systems engineering departments to 
the complexities of the task at hand. 
 
2. MODEL-BASED SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING AND SAFETY 
A major requirement of all safety standards is the ability to 
demonstrate the fulfilment of system level safety goals 
through the implementation of an appropriate system safety 
concept. Safety goals are typically derived based on hazard 
analyses and then refined into functional and technical 
safety requirements that can be allocated to individual 
system components.  
The fulfilment of the safety goals can depend on a number 
of factors such as incorrectly implemented software 
functions or random hardware failures. Such isolated 
failures are relatively simple to detect and protect against 
using standard development techniques as prescribed by 
the standards. The real difficulty however lies in securing 
the system against failures resulting from a combination of 
factors from different layers of the architecture. Classical, 
document based processes are not well suited for coping 
with these types of system interdependencies, as these two 
examples show: 
- During software development, incorrect 
assumptions are made about the integrity of the 
communication medium over which two functions 
interact. Communication faults, latencies etc. are 
not sufficiently considered in the software design. 
This may be due to a re-allocation of pre-existing 
functions across ECUs and buses. 
- A hardware component shows unexpectedly high 
rates of failure due to a use in an installation space 
in the vehicle that is subject to unusually high 
levels of environmental (e.g. temperature, 
vibration, electro-magnetic interference) stress. 
The approach we suggest to handling these types of 
complexity issues is the use of holistic model-based 
systems engineering techniques. These approaches allow a 
system to be specified from a number of different 
viewpoints, linked and made consistent by the use of a 
common underlying model. This data model should cover 
all aspects of EE-System design, from requirements 
specification, through functional architecture and technical 
hardware and software design (see Figure 3). A critical 
aspect of this approach is the ability to model the 
dependencies between these different architectural layers as 
well as domain specific attributes of the modelled artefacts 
(e.g. bus load, hardware fault rates, safety integrity levels, 
temperature ranges of installation locations, etc.). On the 
basis of this level of modelling analysis questions can be 
formulated such as, “are there any cables that run through 
areas of the vehicle that are particularly sensitive to crash 
situations and that carry signals between components for 
whom the correct communication is critical for the 
implementation of safety related functions?”. 
 
Figure 3 Overview architectural layers 
 
With such an approach it becomes possible to achieve a 
much richer integration of the engineering activities than 
with traditional document-based traceability based on 
requirements tags. This in turn leads to a greater level of 
coherency between the engineering artefacts, an important 
attribute when constructing a convincing safety case.  
 
3. SAFETY “ROUND-TRIP 
ENGINEERING” 
Safety standards require that analyses are performed at the 
system, software and hardware levels to identify 
weaknesses in the design and to determine the necessary 
improvement measures. Examples of such analysis are 
FMEA (failure mode and effects analysis) and FTA (fault 
tree analysis). In such analyses the fault behaviour of 
individual components is determined and their impact on 
the safety gaols and their failure rates analysed. A holistic 
approach to systems modelling which refines the system 
goals through a number of layers while retaining the 
functional dependencies between them is an optimal pre-
requisite for performing the safety analyses. Whilst 
performing the safety analyses, the engineers can use this 
information to better identify the potential hazardous 
effects associated with the component failures. The 
resulting improvement measures suggested during the 
analysis can be directly linked to the appropriate parts of 
the system model, thus ensuring traceability for the safety 
case and improvement the efficiency of later impact 
analyses should parts of the design model be changed. 
An extension of the model-based systems engineering 
approaches with elements describing the safety case and 
safety concept could lead to a highly interactive “round-trip 
engineering” approach to safety engineering whereby 
changes for example in the system design will immediately 
point to elements in the safety concept, associated analyses 
and safety case that require rework. Furthermore by 
associating particular design patterns with safety analysis 
and safety case patterns, parts of the safety case structure 
could be automatically generated based on an analysis of 
the design. This could lead to the ability to perform “what-
if” analyses on the design, by formulating an alternative 
design solution and then analysing the impact this would 
have on creating the necessary evidence required for the 
safety case. 
With the publication of ISO 26262 [1], the automotive 
industry has committed itself to implementing the 
principles of functional safety. Whilst contributing to 
providing a common understanding of the development 
processes required to ensure a consideration of functional 
safety in the development of automotive E/E systems, the 
standard contains only weak requirements regarding the 
construction of a safety case as a means of providing a 
convincing argument that the functional safety of the 
developed system has been achieved.  
Experience at a number of automotive manufacturers and 
suppliers currently implementing the standard shows little 
consensus on the role, value and methods for developing, 
maintaining and documenting the safety case. This is not 
helped by the disconnect between the requirements given in 
Part 2 of the standard, which are vague at best, and the 
guidance in Part 10, which describes a proven approach 
established in other industries, but bears little relation to 
Part 2.  As a result, current practices are often restricted to 
interpreting the safety case as a list of safety-related 
documents to be provided at the end of the development 
project. Due to the complexity of the systems being 
developed, it is easy to see the inherent risk associated in 
this approach both in terms of the development project 
losing sight of its progress in achieving the safety goals as 
well as the difficulties in convincing an external assessor of 
the approach taken. The potential benefits of a safety case 
to provide a coherent and convincing argument of the 
functional safety of the system as well for steering the 
development activities are therefore not realized. 
We believe that a structured approach to constructing a 
safety case has the potential for tangible benefits both in 
terms of demonstrating the safety of the system as well as 
increasing the efficiency of the development.  
We propose that safety cases in the form of structured 
arguments that combine both product and process evidence 
are adapted to the development of automotive E/E systems 
and extended in the way that they are integrated into the 
systems engineering lifecycle. 
In this approach, a safety case would be constructed for 
each system safety goal describing the strategies for 
meeting the goals and referencing assumptions, 
justification and evidence in a structured, top-down 
manner. In doing so, the safety case would “knit together” 
the evidence contained within the system model to provide 
a coherent and defensible argument for functional safety. 
 
4. PRODUCT-LINE BASED SAFETY 
ENGINEERING 
One major hurdle to safety-relevant systems development 
is the additional effort associated with engineering 
activities otherwise not required for standard development 
projects. In the concept phase, these activities involve 
performing hazard and risk analyses, developing an 
appropriate system safety concept and deriving the 
technical safety requirements on the system and its 
components. This additional effort is typically not planned 
for in current, ever shortening vehicle development project 
schedules leading either to delays in the project or more 
commonly safety activities being retrospectively performed 
when deficits found late in the system architecture may 
lead to significant additional costs.  
One way of addressing this problem is to use a product-line 
approach to systems engineering to make use of proven, 
domain-specific safety concepts. Such an approach would 
drive systematic reuse across the whole development 
lifecycle based on a set of common development work 
products that are then tailored to take into account the 
vehicle specific functionality, operating conditions and 
architecture. To maximise the benefits of a product-line 
approach for safety related systems, the assets associated 
with the common vehicle features should be extended to 
include hazard and risk analyses and safety concepts. This 
would allow for project specific technical requirements to 
then be derived based on an impact analysis of the 
variations in function, operating conditions and architecture 
and the subsequent adaptation of the common requirements 
specifications.  
By strictly controlling the commonalities and variabilities 
associated with the features, the reuse of technical 
requirements derived from the safety concepts can be 
maximised which in turn will drive the reuse of pre-
developed components and software, thus further reducing 
the efforts associated with implementation and test. 
5. THE WAY FORWARD 
To migrate towards this vision of a model-based, safety-
case driven systems engineering paradigm a number of 
issues must first be addressed: 
- Systems engineering approaches need to be 
extended with the ability to model a safety case 
(here the integration of the Goal structuring 
notation would be ideal) as well as the notion of a 
safety concept (based on architecture and 
behavioural models). 
- Product-line approaches must be integrated into 
the models (at requirements, design and safety 
case level). 
- The approaches must not require manual effort to 
create and manage dependencies between the 
development artefacts. This should be done 
automatically by the underlying tool set that 
supports the development methods. This also 
includes the development and maintenance of the 
safety case. 
- Lastly, industrial strength tool support is required 
not only for allowing engineers to create the 
graphical specifications but also to manage the 
underlying data to ensure consistency between the 
model elements, create baselines, allow for cross-
site collaborative development etc.  
 
 
For meeting the step change required to match the 
capabilities of engineering departments to the complexities 
of the task at hand and to meet the predicted benefit, from 
the suggested methods, an industrial strength tool support 
is a key success factor.  
 
In detail, a development tool chain should supports by 
…managing the complexity in the E/E system design by 
providing an approved semantic data model with domain 
specific attributes (e.g. bus load, latency times)  
…supporting bidirectional traceability between each step of 
development and related artifacts (e.g. from safety goal to 
system safety concept, see Figure 4) 
…ensuring safety analysis and development activities are 
performed on a single source model of the system  
…ensuring consistency between all work products 
referenced by the safety case (configuration management) 
…ensuring the completeness and consistency of the model 
by automatically performed rule based checks 
…providing predefined elements (e.g. operation scenarios, 
operation modes, generic safety goals) 
 
 
Figure 4 Vitalization: Allocation of safety goals to system 
safety concept 
 
Vector Informatik GmbH offers PREEvision as an 
industrial strength tool support for model based systems 
engineering. Integrated business logic and one 
comprehensive data model enables a seamless EE-
development process from requirements, through system, 
SW- and HW-design to test. 
 
 
Figure 5 Model description layers in PREEvision 
 
PREEvision enables model-based architecture development 
on the following layers (Figure 5) 
- Product Goals (Requirements, Features), logical 
architectures (function networks)  
- SW-architectures according to AUTOSAR 
- Network topology (ECUs, bus-systems, sensors, 
actuators) 
- Electrical circuits, wiring harness, and geometrical 
topology 
 
Applying the model based systems engineering approach 
using PREEvision enables the following benefit 
 
- Seamless process support from concept phase to 
production 
- Data reuse, traceability, and impact analysis in 
product line context – single point of truth for E/E 
development 
- Supports frontloading, automatic validation, and 
consistency checks in early development phases 
- Reduced development effort through integrated 
design and safety process  
- System level optimization leads to smarter 
architectures and lower product costs 
- Tool-based concept evaluation  and Rapid 
prototyping leverages validation of cost intensive 
decisions in early development phase 
- Complete modeling and documentation of entire 
architecture 
- Support of team collaboration and cross-
organizational data exchange 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Industry is in a period of change, the focus on functional 
safety is drawing attention to a number of areas in systems 
engineering where significant improvements are needed if 
effective solutions to problems are to be found. 
Vector’s PREEvision Tool Suite will offer the optimal 
solution for safety with its combination of model-based 
systems engineering with integrated process and 
engineering data management.  
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